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Summary:  Non-reciprocal trade preferences and provisions in the GATT/WTO that 
allow developing countries greater leeway to retain or use protectionist policies are two 
of the central planks of so-called special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system. This paper surveys the literature on the 
rationales, institutional features, and economic effectiveness of SDT. A large literature 
has emerged on SDT in the last 50 years, by both proponents and opponents. We 
summarize a number of key contributions on the subject, with a special emphasis on the 
evaluation of  the impact of SDT, especially preferential market access. The issue of SDT 
has become very topical again, following a period during  which it was viewed as an 
outdated concept for the multilateral trading system. We therefore devote attention as 
well to a number of recent contributions  that discuss (i) whether there is a continued 
need for SDT, and (ii) how this might be designed from both a development (recipient) 
objective and from the perspective of the trading system more generally. A major theme 
of the survey is that most of the issues that are debated today were already being 
discussed in the 1960s. We conclude that those who questioned the value of unilateral 
preferences have proven to be prescient.   
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1 This paper was written as the Introduction to a volume of readings on trade preferences and special and 
differential treatment in the GATT/WTO prepared for Edward Elgar. We are grateful to Kym Anderson, 


















































































































   1
Members of the World Trade Organization launched a new “round” of multilateral trade 
negotiations in November 2001 at the Doha Ministerial Conference. The round is 
formally called the Doha Development Agenda, reflecting the desire of many members to 
address development concerns in the multilateral trading system. Defining the 
“development dimension” of the WTO is a major challenge. No consensus exists on 
whether and how to do this. All would agree that development requires sustained 
economic growth. If greater trade opportunities increase growth—something many 
(including the present authors) believe is the case—the WTO process of gradual, 
negotiated liberalization supports development. However, the existence of such a link 
remains a strongly debated issue, and many also argue that in specific circumstances 
there is a development rationale for trade interventions.
2 Indeed, for many years the 
GATT took the latter view: many of its provisions allow developing countries wide 
leeway to retain protectionist policies. This became one of the central elements of so-
called special and differential treatment (SDT) policies for developing countries within 
the GATT regime.  
The underlying ideas were elaborated, most notably, by Raúl Prebisch and Hans 
Singer in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Their main argument is that developing 
countries need to foster industrial capacity  in non-traditional manufactures both to 
reduce import dependence and to diversify away from traditional commodities, which 
were subject to declining terms of trade in the long-term and adversely volatile prices in 
the short-term. Part of the recommended policy prescription was high trade barriers to 
protect infant industries—i.e., import-substitution industrialization.  
At the same time, it was recognized that exports were important as a source of 
foreign exchange and that the local market is generally too small for domestic industry to 
capture economies of scale that accompany industrial expansion. The second facet of the 
SDT agenda, therefore, revolved around preferential market access—a general system of 
trade preferences that would give developing countries better than Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) treatment in the markets of the industrialized countries. The Generalized System 
                                                 
2 One thing that virtually everyone does agree on is that trade is not a sufficient condition for development, 
not withstanding straw men-type arguments to the contrary that are sometimes found in the literature.   2
of Preferences (GSP), the framework to provide such preferences, was established under 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) auspices in 1968.
3  
We focus on the rationale, institutional features, and economic effectiveness of 
SDT. Our aim is not to be exhaustive. A large literature has emerged on SDT in the last 
50 years, by both proponents and opponents. Instead, we collect a number of key 
contributions on the subject, with a special emphasis on the evaluation of  the impact of 
SDT, especially preferential market access. The issue of SDT became very topical again 
in recent years after a period during  which SDT was viewed as an outdated concept for 
the multilateral trading system. In order to reflect the re-emerging policy interest in SDT, 
we have made an effort to include a number of recent contributions  that discuss (i) 
whether there is a continued need for SDT, and (ii) how this might be designed from both 
a development (recipient) objective and from the perspective of the trading system more 
generally. An important question confronting the WTO members is whether the basic 
principle of the GATT/WTO regime—nondiscrimination—should continue to be 
hollowed out by policies that advocate active discrimination against some members 
(including many developing countries) in order to provide “better” market access to other 
developing countries—“aid through trade” (Panagariya, 2003b).  
We do not discuss articles analyzing the economic effects of specific GATT 
provisions that grant developing countries greater leeway to protect their markets. There 
are numerous provisions that permit this—e.g., Article XVIII, which was amended in the 
1955 GATT review session,  allows developing countries to use quantitative trade 
restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes and infant industry protection. This is 
because there is a large literature on such policies, and specific instruments that are 
covered by the GATT/WTO are covered in other volumes.
4 For the same reason we have 
not included analyses of discriminatory quota regimes such as the Multifibre 
Arrangement or the preferential quota access that has been granted by the EU to certain 
developing countries for commodities such as bananas and sugar. In practice, such non-
tariff trade policies have had major impacts both in terms of distorting world trade flows 
and generating benefits and costs for both preferred and excluded countries. Indeed, most 
                                                 
3 UNCTAD was founded in 1964, with Raúl Prebisch as the first Secretary-General. 
4 Anderson and Hoekman (forthcoming), Bown (forthcoming), and Ethier and Hillman (forthcoming).   3
unilateral preference programs were designed to allow exports of certain developing 
countries to overcome protectionist policies in developed countries. For example, CBI 
(Caribbean Basin Initiative) and AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act)  mainly 
granted preferences in apparel sectors which were restricted by MFA quotas and the main 
beneficiaries of the EBA (Everything But Arms) Initiative are (will be) certain 
agricultural products—e.g., sugar.  
 
Original Motivation, Early Critiques and Implications for the GATT 
The first contribution is UNCTAD (1964), a report written under Prebisch’s direction. It 
outlines the arguments in favor of trade preferences in detail. The main role of unilateral 
preferences is to support infant-industry policies and the expansion of exports in 
manufactures is only a part of the overall industrialization process. The report recognizes 
that preferences clash with two principles of the GATT-based multilateral trade regime: 
reciprocity (the main instrument through which free riding is prevented when 
commitments to lower trade barriers are made) and non-discrimination (the MFN rule).  
Indeed, the report notes the potential negative impact unilateral trade preferences might 
have on multilateral MFN-based  trade liberalization efforts. It also foresees one of the 
problems that has plagued the implementation  of SDT in the GATT/WTO over the 
decades, namely, which countries should be eligible? It is argued that competition 
amongst developing countries might limit the overall benefits, and that the duration of 
preferences and graduation needed to be decided carefully. The report supports the notion 
that preference margins should decrease as the income levels of beneficiaries increased, 
and recognizes that administrative issues such as documentary requirements could reduce 
the benefits of preference programs.   
Gardner Patterson (1965) elaborates in detail many of the criticisms that have 
been raised repeatedly against preferences in the following decades. He questions 
whether preferences are an efficient way to help the developing countries, noting that 
producers in beneficiary countries need to compete with domestic producers in the donor 
country as well as other exporters. He asks how many products there are for which a 5-7 
percent preference margin would make a significant  difference—the GSP involved tariff 
preferences, not duty- and quota-free access of the type that is now accorded to the least   4
developed countries (LDCs).
5 Furthermore, even in sectors where preferences would 
make a difference, they might lead to specialization in products where the beneficiary 
country did not have inherent comparative advantage, resulting in socially wasteful 
investment. Other costs of preferences that are identified include political frictions among 
beneficiary and excluded countries, especially among developing countries that are at 
different stages of development; administrative costs, possibly prohibitive, especially due 
to rules of origin; and attenuated incentives for multilateral MFN liberalization—not only 
might beneficiary countries cease to press for liberalization, they might actually oppose it 
since it would imply erosion of their preference margins. He notes that parliaments such 
as the US Congress would have to get involved in the process of granting preferences, 
which might open the gates for other protectionist pressures. In short, Patterson concludes 
that the costs of implementing preferences would be higher than the benefits in the then-
prevailing situation. 
Another early evaluation of the likely impacts of preferences is Johnson (1967). 
He identifies a number of additional problems, but is not as pessimistic as Patterson. 
Among the arguments made against preferences he repeats that (i) political conflicts 
among and between developed and developing countries due to trade diversion are 
likely,
6 and (ii) that administrative costs of implementing and monitoring preferences can 
be high. Johnson argues that the true metric for determining the net benefits is the extent 
to which the effective rate of protection is lowered through preferences. Johnson also 
draws attention to a critical economic difference between infant industry protection and 
preferences. The former is a transfer from consumers to producers in the developing 
country. In the latter case the transfer is from the consumers in the developed country. 
Johnson also notes that preferences will yield the highest benefits to developing countries 
                                                 
5 A group of the poorest countries that is defined by the United Nations, with inclusion based on specific 
criteria. At the time of writing there were 49 LDCs.  
6 The case of the dispute that arose at the 2001 WTO ministerial meeting at Doha provides an example of 
such tensions, ACP members sought an extension of the GATT waiver for their preferences. Eventually  
the debate—which pitted non-ACP developing country exporters against ACP preference beneficiaries—
led to a deal, but it was a good illustration of how preferences can create conflicts amongst developing 
countries. In this case, Thailand and the Philippines eventually joined the consensus to grant a waiver for 
EU preferences for ACP countries only after the EU agreed to consultations on the impact of these 
preferences on their exports of canned tuna (under the waiver, ACP countries would continue to be exempt 
from the 24 percent tariff applied to all other imports of canned tuna).  The EU ultimately agreed to 
establish an MFN tariff quota on canned tuna of 25,000 tons at a 12 percent tariff, but it did so in the face 
of opposition in ACP countries.     5
in sectors that are the most protected in developed countries—making it difficult to 
implement meaningful preference schemes. This was prescient, as it has been a reason 
why agricultural products, textiles and apparel frequently have been excluded from deep 
preferences. In another example of accurate foresight, Johnson was concerned that donor 
countries will use preferences for political purposes “to reward and punish the recipients 
for their behavior and performance” in non-economic areas (p.199). Johnson concludes 
with a call for detailed analyses to evaluate the actual impact of preferences, without 
taking a strong position on either side of the debate.  
Subsequent researchers return again and again to the various criticisms and 
problems raised in these two papers. Many papers are largely efforts to comply with 
Johnson’s recommendation for research to identify the effects of preference programs. It 
is striking to what extent the arguments that are made in later work are repetitive of those 
that were raised from the very beginning. Only very recently have theoretical arguments 
been put forward that advance the debate and the analysis of the economic rationales of 
SDT beyond what was generated in the 1960s. Most research that advanced the state of 
our knowledge in this area was either empirical or an exercise in applying new 
computational techniques and data processing power to simulate the general equilibrium 
effects of preferences.  
The 1970s witnessed efforts to go beyond preference regimes and create a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) that would favor developing countries. Elements 
of the NIEO included (i) additional preferential market access to developed-country 
markets, (ii) changes in international primary commodity markets to reduce price 
volatility and declines, (iii) increased foreign aid, (iv) technology transfer, and (v) 
revision of the international monetary system to finance the recurring deficits.  Finger and 
Kreinin (1976) provide a critical assessment of the arguments that were made in favor of 
the NIEO, noting that many of the instruments that were proposed would be ineffective 
or counter-productive (see also Bhagwati, 1977 and Corden, 1979). As is the case with 
the debates on preferences that continue to this day, many of the concerns that 
underpinned the effort to create a NIEO continue to prevail—in particular devising 
stronger international mechanisms to help countries benefit from trade, the transfer of   6
financial resources and technology (know how) to developing countries, and what is now 
called the need for “policy coherence.”  
Written more than two decades after the UNCTAD, Patterson and Johnson 
contributions, Hudec’s (1987) evaluation of the costs and benefits of preferences suggests 
that the initial concerns raised by the critics had substance. Hudec highlights the fact that 
under GATT preferences were simply “permissive, not mandatory.” Since they were not 
contractual obligations of the donor countries, preferences were also outside the 
protection the GATT dispute resolution process. Hudec argues that this is among the 
main reasons why preferences rarely delivered the expected benefits to the developing 
countries. The moment beneficiary countries increased their exports considerably they 
would lose eligibility, either through automatic removal criteria or as a result of political 
pressures by the import-competing sectors within the donor country. GATT provided no 
recourse for them to challenge this. 
As mentioned, the GSP conflicts with basic GATT rules. In recognition of this, 
GATT members approved special waivers for the GSP, temporarily in 1971 and 
permanently in 1979 through the “Enabling Clause” (part of the Tokyo Round set of 
Agreements). This followed the creation of a Committee on Trade and Development and 
the addition of several articles to the GATT that addressed development issues in the mid 
1960s—the current Part IV of the GATT (on Trade and Development). Part IV 
encompassed the new principle that reciprocity in multilateral negotiating rounds should 
be limited to whatever was consistent with the development needs of developing 
countries (Article XXXVI). The 1979 Enabling Clause (formally Differential and More 
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries), 
gave permanent legal cover for the GSP—before then it required a waiver. The Enabling 
Clause included language on “graduation”: SDT policies were to be phased out as the 
recipient countries reached a certain level of economic development. However, criteria 
for this were not clearly defined, as true for eligibility for SDT. Developing country 
status was (and remains) determined by self-declaration—the only formal group of 
developing countries defined in Part IV and the Enabling Clause are the LDCs. Thus, all 
decisions on country eligibility, product coverage and preference margins were left to the   7
discretion of  the preference granting countries.
7 SDT provisions, including GSP, are 
“best endeavors” commitments; moreover, donor countries may include either trade or 
non-trade conditionality, de jure or de facto. 
One result of the Enabling Clause and the GSP was that developing countries 
played only a minor role in the development of the multilateral trading system. Until the 
Uruguay Round negotiations of 1986-94, their participation was à la carte, and many did 
not make trade-liberalizing commitments in GATT negotiations (although they did over 
time implement unilateral trade liberalization, especially in the 1980s).  With the entry 
into force of the WTO in 1995, the terms of their participation changed.  Because of the 
so-called “Single Undertaking”, developing countries became subject to most of the 
disciplines of the many agreements reached in the Uruguay Round negotiations. This was 
a big change for the trading system and it has had major repercussions—including a 
resurgence in demands for more effective SDT in the Doha round.  
Before turning to the evidence on the effects of preferences and proposals for 
changes to SDT in the WTO, we briefly summarize the major provisions of GSP-type 
programs. 
Main Features of Unilateral Market Access Programs 
The European Union and the United States passed legislation establishing their General 
System of Preferences (GSP) regimes in 1971 and 1974, respectively. Although Japan, 
Canada, Australia and several other countries implemented their own GSP regimes, the 
EU and the US have been and continue to be the most important markets for the 
developing countries over recent decades.
8 
The GSP program of the United States is rather straight-forward.  The program 
divides eligible countries into two groups based on their income levels – all developing 
                                                 
7 Note that the Enabling Clause only exempts preference programs that apply to all developing countries or 
that target the LDCs. No other country discrimination in the application of preferences is formally 
permitted. It is for this reason that the ACP preferences required an explicit WTO waiver in 1994. Pretty 
much throughout the GATT period this requirement of the Enabling Clause was ignored as no member 
complained. This changed in the early 1990s with the report of a GATT panel dealing with the EU banana 
import policy. The panel found the EU regime for banana imports from ACP members violated Art. 1 
GATT (MFN). Subsequently, the EU requested and obtained a waiver for the duration of Lomé convention. 
As the treaty ended in early 2000, another waiver was necessary to maintain ACP preferences. As 
discussed, this became an issue at the Doha ministerial. 
8 See Onguglo (1999) for a review of existing schemes and their operation.   8
countries and a subset of the least developed. At the time of writing, all eligible countries 
pay zero tariffs on around 4,650 tariff lines; LDCs have duty-free market access for an 
additional 1,750 lines. The 1974 Trade Act allows the President to confer GSP eligibility 
on any country except those that (a) do not offer reasonable and equitable market access 
for U.S.  goods, (b) do not adequately and effectively protect U.S.  intellectual property 
rights, (c) do not reduce trade-distorting investment policies and export practices, (d) 
harbor international terrorists, (e) nationalize American property without compensation, 
(f) are members of a commodity export cartel causing "serious disruption to the world 
economy," or, are (g) communist states (except those that have been granted permanent 
normal trading status).  The law stipulates other criteria that may be used in eligibility 
decisions, such as (a) level of economic development, (b) protection of workers' and 
human rights and (c) whether the country receives preferences from other countries.  
Certain articles are prohibited from receiving GSP treatment. These include most textiles, 
watches, footwear, handbags, luggage and certain apparel.   
One of the key features of the GSP program is that a specific country may lose 
eligibility for a specific product if its exports exceed a certain "competitive need limit," 
currently $110 million per tariff line.  If the country in question has a market share larger 
than 50% of total US imports in that category, it may also lose the GSP eligibility.
9  GSP 
eligibility can be removed at the country, product, or country-product level. The 
President has discretion over when and how to apply these criteria.  In practice, an 
Assistant US Trade Representative chairs an interagency committee which makes 
eligibility and graduation decisions after reviewing petitions from interested parties (the 
country in question, import-competing domestic firms, labor unions, other firms, human 
rights/environmental NGOs, etc.). Hudec (1987) concludes that a consequence is that 
import-competing lobby groups have made GSP a bastion of unregulated protectionism 
in the United States. Since the program first entered into force in 1976, 36 of the 154 
eligible countries have "graduated" from the GSP program (including Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Botswana). Major countries remaining 
eligible include Brazil, India, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa, and Thailand.   
                                                 
9 However, there is a de minimis waiver.  The President has the discretion to waive the Competitive Need 
Limit if the total imports of the US in that category from all countries (both GSP eligible and ineligible) 
does not exceed $16.5 million (in 2003).     9
The most important development in unilateral market access policies since the 
establishment of the GSP is the implementation of special programs that target specific 
countries and regions.  The United States initiated the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in 
1984 and modified it in 1990.  Twenty-four countries in the Caribbean and Central 
America are eligible.  The 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), which 
extended preferences to textiles and apparel, passed in 2000, extended the benefits of the 
original program considerably.  In essence, the new rules provides NAFTA-equivalent 
treatment for certain items (mainly apparel) which had partial preferences under the 
original CBI and were excluded from duty-free treatment under the GSP.  The next 
regional program is Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) which extends preferences to 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.  Enacted in 1991 as part of U.S.  efforts to reduce 
narcotic production and trafficking, it was modeled after the CBI and has similar 
eligibility requirements and product coverage.  ATPA was renewed in 2002 as the 
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) and expanded to include 
tuna, leather and footwear products, petroleum products, and apparel—subject, however, 
to restrictive rules of origin.  For example, if apparel is assembled from U.S.  fabrics, no 
quotas or duties apply, but if local inputs are used, duty-free imports are subject to a cap 
of 2 percent of total U.S.  imports (increasing to 5 percent in equal annual installments).  
The final program implemented by the US is the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), passed in 2000, which offers beneficiary Sub-Saharan African countries duty-
free and quota-free market access for essentially all products.  AGOA excludes textiles 
but extends duty- and quota-free treatment for apparel made in Africa from U.S.  yarn 
and fabric.  If regional fabric and yarn are used, there is a cap of 1.5 percent of U.S.  
imports, increasing to 3.5 percent over eight years.  African LDCs are exempt from all 
rules of origin for a limited period of time, helping to significantly expand apparel 
exports from countries such as Lesotho.  A key feature of all of these programs, including 
the GSP, is that they are in effect for certain period of time and need to be renewed by the 
Congress periodically after deliberations.  In the past, GSP had lapsed twice and was re-
introduced retroactively after substantial delay.  These additional uncertainties about the 
future of preference programs further lower the incentives to invest in eligible sectors to 
increase export potential in the long run.     10
The European Union GSP scheme, first implemented in 1971, is more complex 
than the US regime, but has the same basic principles.
10 Whereas the United States 
program grants duty-free market access to all eligible products, the initial EU 
arrangement classified products into four groups that enjoyed different preference 
margins: (i) non-sensitive products were granted duty-free market access; (ii) semi-
sensitive  products had a tariff rate that is 35% of the Common Customs Tariff (CCT); 
(iii) sensitive products had a tariff rate of 70% of CCT and (iv) very sensitive  products 
faced a tariff rate of 85% of CCT (EC Council Regulation No.2820/98, 21 December 
1998).  In 2001, this system was simplified to span only two categories – sensitive and 
non-sensitive.  The latter group enjoys duty-free market access, and accounts for around 
32% of all tariff lines. Sensitive products receive a 3.5 percentage point reduction from 
the applicable MFN rate.
11 These products comprise around 36% of tariff lines (EC 
Council Regulation No.2501/01, 10 December 2001).  As sensitive products are generally 
the ones with high MFN rates, the proportionate impact of the preference can be rather 
small.   
Country eligibility for the EU GSP program is determined on the basis of a more 
codified approach than in the US, with graduation determined by “indices” that combine 
the development and specialization level of the country:  
2




where Y i (YEU) is the GDP per capita in the beneficiary country (EU) and X i (XEU) is the 
manufactured exports of the beneficiary country (EU) to the EU (beneficiary country).  
The index increases in value as the beneficiary country becomes more developed and/or 
runs a surplus in manufactured goods trade with the EU. It has a value of zero, for 
example, if the beneficiary country has the same GNP per capita as the EU and has 
balanced trade.  If the country has GDP per capita above $8, 210 and the index has a 
value greater than –1, it is automatically removed from the GSP program. South Korea, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, among others, were removed from the GSP program on the 
                                                 
10 See Grilli (1997) for additional discussion of EU programs, including those for Eastern Europe and 
Mediterranean countries, which are reciprocal. 
11 For silk products and certain apparel categories, the preference margin is 20% of the MFN rate if they are 
in the “sensitive” category.  If specific duties are applied, then they are reduced by 30%.  If both ad 
valorem and specific tariffs are applied, then the specific duty is not reduced.     11
basis of these criteria. A second graduation criterion is country/sector-specific and is 
based on the extent of specialization: the relationship between the proportion of the 
imports in a given sector from a given country to the total EU imports in that sector and 
this country’s share of total EU imports. A higher specialization index indicates that the 
county’s exports to the EU are more concentrated in that category. As a result of this 
criterion, Brazil, India, China, Argentina and many other countries have lost eligibility 
for a wide range of product categories.   
The EU GSP program has a safeguard clause that allows preferences to be 
suspended for certain products/countries if imports “cause or threaten to cause serious 
difficulties to a Community producer.” The US program, in effect, has the same rule in 
place: any US producer can petition the USTR for any country’s or product’s GSP 
privileges to be revoked due to real or potential injury.  The EU has also instituted 
“special incentive arrangements” that reward compliance with International Labor 
Organization Conventions, protection of environment and combating drug production and 
trafficking. Countries that benefit from these special arrangements receive additional 
preferences on certain products in the sensitive list.  Finally, as in the US, human right 
violations, money laundering, corruption and violation of various international 
conventions on the environment may result in withdrawal of preferences. 
In addition to the GSP, the EU has other preference programs, most notably 
preferences accorded to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) under what is now the 
Cotonou convention.
12 These countries are granted preferences that often exceed those 
available under the GSP.  Most industrial products have duty and quota free market 
access whereas the preferences are less comprehensive for agricultural products.  In 2000 
                                                 
12 This is an international treaty that provides a framework for cooperation between the EU and former 
colonies of EU member states. The associated commitments are binding and cannot be unilaterally 
modified by a signatory. Thus, ACP preferences are more secure than the GSP. The Cotonou convention 
supercedes earlier treaties, the Yaoundé (1963-75) and Lomé (1975-99) conventions. The extent of 
preferential access granted under these treaties has varied over time. Under Yaoundé ACP states were 
required to offer reciprocal trade concessions; this was later removed under influence of the GSP. In 
general, preferences for agricultural products were much more limited than for manufactures. In reflection 
of this, under Lomé a mechanism was introduced (STABEX ) to allow for compensation of ACP states if 
their export revenues (to the EU) for major agricultural products dropped by more than 2% of the average 
earnings generated over the previous four years. Under the Cotonou convention STABEX was replaced by 
a commitment to provide “a system of additional support in order to mitigate the adverse effects of any 
instability in export earnings, including in the agricultural and mining sectors, within the financial envelope 
for support to long-term development” (Article 68).   12
duties were still applied to 856 tariff lines (837 of which were agricultural products).  Of 
these, 116 lines were excluded from the Cotonou Agreement. An additional 301 tariff 
lines were eligible for reduced duties, subject to specific quantitative limits (tariff quotas) 
set for the ACP countries as a group. The remaining 439 products were eligible for 
reduced duties without quantitative limits.  Another important EU program is the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, introduced in March 2001.  This program grants 
duty-free access to imports of all products from the LDCs except for three major products 
where liberalization is delayed: fresh bananas, rice, and sugar. Tariffs on these items will 
be reduced gradually to zero by 2006 for bananas and by 2009 for rice and sugar, with 
tariff quotas for rice and sugar increased annually during the transition. A key feature of 
the EBA is that, in contrast to the GSP, preferences are granted for an unlimited period 
and are not subject to periodic review.   
 
Economic Analysis 
There has been a significant amount of econometric and simulation analysis of the effects 
of preferences.
13 Most of this has focused on national GSP schemes which  can be 
explained by the fact that for some time this was the predominant scheme used by 
developed countries. By focusing on the GSP, there is also greater scope for comparisons 
to be made across programs of different preference-granting countries. However, it must 
be kept  in mind that, in practice, especially during the last 20 years or so, GSP is not the 
scheme that offers “most preferred” status. That is generally reserved for free trade 
agreement partners—who liberalize on a reciprocal basis—and subsets of “more 
preferred” developing countries. In the case of the EU this includes ACP and EBA 
eligible countries; in the case of the US better than GSP treatment is accorded under 
AGOA, ANDEAN and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act  (CBERA). Thus, a 
country that trades under the GSP is actually suffering discrimination, as it is excluded 
from the better preference schemes available to (a subset of) its competitors. Any analysis 
that looks only at the GSP will therefore provide a rather distorted picture of the reality. 
The same is true if account is not taken of other trade policy instruments. In the case of 
textiles and clothing, the Multi-fiber Arrangement (MFA) for many decades established a 
                                                 
13 See Brown (1988) for a survey of the literature up to the mid 1980s.   13
global quota regime that restrained the more competitive developing country exporters. 
This regime de facto provided a preference margin for countries that were less 
competitive, or initially not producing these products at all since they were not bound by 
quotas. As noted by Page and Kleen (2004), when assessing the use of preferences, it is 
important that researchers consider the most valuable preferences, those that grant 
guaranteed prices and quotas. This is —often  neglected as these guarantees are embodied 
in other provisions and agreements, not the GSP or other preference schemes. 
Preferences can only have an impact if there is a non-zero tariff in the importing 
market.  Two-thirds of the major items Africa exports to Canada, for example, face zero 
MFN tariffs; and 69% of EU imports from Africa (by value) in 2000 were in items facing 
zero MFN duties (Stevens and Kennan, 2004).  Thus, empirical assessments must focus 
on dutiable imports. Even here, if the MFN rate is negligible—below 2 or 3 percent—it 
may not be worth incurring the administrative costs of complying with rules of origin and 
other requirements (see below).  
Empirical analysis of the effects of preferences is confounded by the difficulty of 
identifying the specific impact of preferences as opposed to other factors. Clearly the 
observed growth rate of exports from recipients to the countries granting trade 
preferences is not informative without controlling for other factors. A common approach 
has been to use (i) simulation methods to estimate trade creation/diversion—which are 
sensitive to assumptions regarding elasticities—or (ii) gravity regressions where 
preference status is captured by a dummy variable. However, most studies have severe 
shortcomings as they fail to take into account that (a) preference rules  are often 
determined at the very disaggregated product level, (b) the elasticity estimates at this 
level of aggregation are generally absent , and (c) finding the right controls to include in 
regressions are difficult. These data and methodological problems help explain why the 
policy-oriented literature has tended to rely heavily on descriptive indicators. Four 
indicators are particularly common: (i) calculation of preference margins—the difference 
between MFN and preferential tariffs for products; (ii) potential coverage—the ratio 
between products covered by a scheme and the dutiable imports originating in beneficiary 
countries; (iii) utilization:  the ratio between imports that actually receive preferential 
treatment and those that are in principle covered, a measure of how effectively   14
beneficiaries are able to use preferences; and (iv) utility: the ratio of the value of imports 
that get preferences to all dutiable imports from that exporter.  
The first empirical analyses of preference schemes appeared in the early 1970s. 
Looking at the pre-GSP trade flows, Cooper (1972) concluded that “the European scheme 
… will offer little help in furthering the economic objectives of developing countries.” 
He points out that the “preference scheme is most generous for those products in which 
the developing countries are least competitive… In contrast, it offers little incentive, or 
none at all, to expand exports of those products which are currently of greatest interest to 
the developing countries, for such export must pay, or expect soon to pay, the full tariff 
duty” (p. 381).  Murray (1973) is also pessimistic about the eventual impact of the 
preferences. He points out that “only 4% of beneficiary trade qualifies for preferential 
treatment under an implemented scheme” and that this only would double when the US 
implements her program (the US only did so in 1976). He emphasizes that this is due to 
both free trade on most raw materials exported by developing countries and the exclusion 
of other products of export-interest to LDCs such as apparel. Murray also notes that there 
is almost always a ceiling on the amount of exports that can enter duty-free. The 
advantages of preferences therefore disappear for the “marginal trade and the program 
simply amounts to a transfer of revenue amounting to the revenue forgone by the 
donors.” The scheme therefore eliminates “stimulus for investment and expanded 
exports.” 
Finger (1975, 1976) assesses a complementary preferential trade scheme that 
predates the GSP and has continued to be applied by both the EU and US as part of their 
customs regimes: outward processing (EU) or offshore assembly (US). Under such 
customs regimes goods that originate in the EU or US are shipped abroad for processing 
and pay only tariffs on the value added by the processing when re-imported. The offshore 
assembly program (OAP) was quite relevant at the time because the US had not 
implemented a GSP scheme as of the early 1970s. Finger estimates that coverage of 
“real” i.e., net or additional trade (value added) under the OAP was greater than for EEC 
GSP—which had entered into force in 1971.  A problem with the latter was the 
associated quota limits (as also pointed out by Cooper  and Murray). Finger speculated 
that EEC OAP could be more effective and see greater trade expansion than GSP In fact,   15
in the period after 1989, this was certainly the case for the Central and Eastern European 
countries and the so-called outward processing trade became a major engine for trade 
expansion and integration of these economies into the EU.
14 In effect the OAP was 
analogous to preferences with restrictive rules of origin as duty free treatment applied 
only if the inputs were sourced from the US. Finger notes that because of this de facto 
origin requirement, the OAP created a strong local (US) lobby in its favor—a prescient 
observation that helps to explain restrictive rules of origin. 
The next set of empirical papers included in this volume appeared several years 
after GSP had been implemented, so that there was enough data to evaluate it. These 
papers ask if they expand exports from beneficiary countries and at what cost to the 
donor country (in welfare terms). The methodology used is essentially a Vinerian one that 
revolves around estimating trade creation and diversion effects of discrimination.  
Baldwin and Murray (1977) conclude that trade creation is greater than diversion, but that 
the trade expansion effects of GSP was limited by product exclusions and quantity 
(quota) ceilings. They then analyze the impact of MFN liberalization on the preference-
receiving countries. This so-called preference erosion issue, currently very topical, has 
been a central part of the debate on preferences from the very beginning. They argue that 
developing countries stand to gain from MFN liberalization on the basis of a hypothetical 
(simulation) scenario of a 50%  cut in all MFN tariffs. Using a partial equilibrium 
framework, they find that the losses due to preference erosion are more than compensated 
by the liberalization in products excluded from preferences, suggesting that the interests 
of developing countries are better served through multilateral MFN liberalization. A 
natural question then is why developing countries expressed concern over MFN 
liberalization at the time. This question is also a mainstay of the preferences debate, one 
that recurs again and again (see below).
15 
                                                 
14 See e.g., Hoekman and Djankov (1997) for an empirical assessment and references to the literature. 
15 Karsenty and Laird (1987) adopt a similar methodology as Baldwin and Murray, using more 
disaggregated data and a longer time series. They find that the impact of GSP is much smaller, only 2.4% 
of developing country exports, as opposed to 25% of eligible exports predicted by Baldwin and Murray. 
The Baldwin and Murray (1977) paper highlights the importance of having good estimates of the relevant 
elasticities of substitution between foreign and domestic goods and between foreign products of different 
origin, as the magnitude of their estimated effects were of course sensitive to the parameters used. They 
assumed—in the absence of information to the contrary—that these elasticities were identical. General 
equilibrium studies by contrast tend to use Armington elasticities.   16
One of the first papers to econometrically estimate effects of preferences was 
Sapir (1981). He uses a bilateral gravity model of the trade flows between the EEC and 
the developing countries, and obtains results that are similar to those of Baldwin and 
Murray.
16 The first estimation is over total trade volume. The GSP-coefficient is positive 
and significant in only two out of the eight years where the GSP was implemented. In a 
second sector-specific estimation, the GSP coefficient is significant in 14 out of the 24 
possible cases. Although Sapir interprets these findings as evidence in favor of 
preferences, the results are not particularly robust. Sapir warns that the group of 
beneficiary countries selected for the exercise is biased in favor of the larger ones. 
Furthermore, his analysis indicates that increases in bilateral trade might due to diversion 
of beneficiaries’ exports from other markets into the EEC and does not show that overall 
exports of the beneficiary countries  actually increased.  
In a follow-up paper, Sapir and Lundberg (1984) analyze US preferences. They 
discuss the institutional background of the US GSP regime in detail, and highlight how 
product and country coverage, rules of origin requirements and quantitative limits on 
eligible products limit GSP benefits. They find that the trade creation effect of 
preferences is around 15% of the imports from eligible countries, and that the benefits are 
concentrated among certain products and beneficiary countries. They also find that the 
magnitude of the  preference margin by product/country and the (initial) supply capacity 
of a country are both statistically significant determinants of  a positive export impact. 
These conclusions are echoed again and again in recent policy discussions, and help 
explain why benefits of preferences have consistently been found to be highly 
concentrated among a relatively small group of economies.   
On the basis of their analysis, Sapir and Lundberg recommend that product 
coverage should made as wide as possible, that quantitative limits and competitive need 
restrictions be removed, and that graduation be based on overall economic development 
rather than performance in a specific export sector. These are all suggestions that 
continue to be made to this day, and that, to some extent, were gradually incorporated 
into some of the most recent preference regimes for the poorest countries. Note that an 
                                                 
16 One advantage of the ex post gravity approach is that it will also (implicitly) capture the general 
equilibrium effects of the preferences, i.e., second-order on other goods and on factor markets.   17
expansion of the coverage of preferences is also a (temporary) mechanism to attenuate 
preference erosion due to MFN liberalization. This response to preference erosion is one 
that also continues to resonate today—many developing countries insist on compensation 
for preference erosion within the trading system, as opposed to additional aid or 
assistance to expand supply side capacity.
17 However, as MFN rates converge towards 
zero, the scope for maintaining preference margins is becoming ever more difficult. 
Brown (1987) was the first to provide results based on a numerical general 
equilibrium analysis, in contrast to the previous studies which employed partial 
equilibrium analysis. A general equilibrium framework is superior to a partial equilibrium 
approach as it allows for possible terms of trade effects, which are critical for any 
assessment of the welfare impact of preferences. If preferential opening up has a negative 
effect on the donor’s terms of trade it may reduce welfare. Brown (1987) uses a general 
equilibrium trade model under two different assumptions regarding substitution between 
domestic and foreign goods. One assumes each good can be produced in any of the 
countries, the other assumes each country exports a single differential product (i.e., goods 
are differentiated on the basis of their origin). This assumption implies that even small 
countries have a certain degree of market power.
18  
Brown’s findings are quite different from those found by Baldwin and Murray or 
Sapir and other authors that had used partial equilibrium models. Her results show that 
the overall trade diversion effect is larger than the creation effect, implying welfare loss 
for the United States. Again, benefits are highly concentrated among a small number of 
higher-income developing countries, while Canada, Japan and Germany appear to be the 
most adversely affected by the associated trade diversion. In a subsequent analysis, 
Brown (1989a) applies computational general equilibrium techniques to analyze 
European preferences. Again she finds that the trade creation effect is much smaller than 
                                                 
17 Another early analysis that assess the impact of preferences by comparing the export revenues of 
beneficiary countries with an estimate of the counterfactual revenues they might have had without 
preferences is Aitken and Obutelewicz (1976). They use a gravity model with a dummy variable for 
preference-eligibility, and conclude that in the 1960s African countries exported about 25 percent more 
than they would otherwise have. 
18 Brown’s work helped also to increase awareness of the importance of the magnitude of the assumed 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods in simulations of the impact of trade policy 
changes—the lower the elasticity, the greater the implied market power for a small (preferred) country, and 
the smaller the positive impact on welfare of trade liberalization.   18
that obtained from previous research, but, in this case, is larger than the trade diversion 
effect. Nevertheless, there are welfare losses for the donor countries. Benefits are again 
highly concentrated among a few developing countries.
19   
The impact of preferences is obviously affected by the product coverage and the 
various limitations and constraints that are imposed by the various national schemes. 
Clark and Zarilli [1992] note that such limits may go beyond what is formally embodied 
in the programs in terms of conditionality and graduation criteria. They show that 
preference-granting countries have used non-tariff trade policy instruments to limit access 
to the market, thus nullifying or reducing the benefits of preferential access. Devault 
(1996) estimates the impact of one specific limitation that is often found in preference 
programs: competitive need limits. These are quantitative limits (upper bounds) imposed 
on successful exporters under GSP. Once these quotas have been exceeded, the 
preferences are withdrawn (see above). Devault finds that the limits that apply in the US 
program reduce potential exports by 10-17 percent, and that the main beneficiaries of 
these restrictions are not competing exporters in the rest of the world but the US import-
competing firms.  
Nontariff barriers (NTBs) and competitive need limits are a reflection of the 
political economy realities that determine trade policies in all countries. Clearly, the more 
competitive are the preference receiving countries, and the greater their capacity to sell 
into the import market is, the more resistance there will be from import-competing 
industries in the donor country. Such interests have been able to employ various 
mechanisms to control the volume (value) of preferred imports—as reflected in the  
various provisions described earlier when summarizing the main features of preference 
schemes. Analysis has centered more on other issues: the (possibly unintended) costs of 
associated with administration of preference schemes—which restrict their value to 
recipients; and the political economy of preferences, including their relationship to 
development aid, the distribution of associated rents, and the impacts of preferences on 
the trade policies of donor and beneficiary countries. 
                                                 
19 Using the same model, Brown (1989b) finds that the Japanese GSP is strongly trade creating, because 
preferential treatment is offered primarily on products for which Japan is a major world exporter. Here also 
tariff concessions result in a deterioration in Japan's terms of trade, which lowers welfare in Japan and 
improves the welfare of Japan's major trading partners.   19
Most of the research has for obvious reasons focused on the effects and the 
potential for preferential access to OECD markets. As developing countries have 
increased their per capita incomes at very different rates since the 1960s, some have 
become substantially better off than others. As a result, there is great potential for so-
called South-South trade, and proposals have been made for more advanced developing 
countries to grant preferences to the poorest countries. Erzan, Laird and Yeats (1988) 
analyze the formal (UN) proposal to establish a Global System of Trade Preferences 
(GSTP) among developing countries. Using a partial equilibrium framework, they 
simulate the potential increase in South-South trade that could result from 
implementation of a GSTP. They conclude that full tariff preferences (i.e., 100 percent 
margins) could increase South-South trade by about 17 percent. As always, results are 
sensitive to choice of elasticities.  
 
The utilization of preferences 
Rules of origin need to be a part of preference programs to prevent trade deflection. Any 
such rules give rise to enforcement costs, but  they may also be captured by import-
competing lobbies seeking to make them prohibitively costly. A seminal paper on rules of 
origin is Herin (1986), the first to quantify the costs associated with them. Herin analyzed 
trade between EFTA members and the EEC—trade flows that in principle should have 
been duty free due to a trade agreement, and found that one-quarter of flows paid the 
applicable MFN duty rather than claim duty free treatment. He concluded that the rules of 
origin were equivalent to an import tariff between 3 and 5 percent. Subsequent work, 
much of it quite recent, comes to very similar conclusions in terms of the tariff equivalent 
of rules of origin. Given that MFN tariffs have fallen over time, this further reduces the 
effective value of tariff preferences.
20  
                                                 
20 Brenton (2003), Brenton and Manchin (2002), Cadot et al (2003), Inama (2003), and Anson et al. (2004). 
Brenton and Manchin (2002) found that only 35% of CEECs’ exports enter the EU using the lowest tariff 
for which they would be eligible. Inama (2003) finds that almost two-thirds of imports by the Quad from 
GSP beneficiaries entered under a preference scheme, but that only two-fifths benefited from a preference. 
GSP utilization rates for preferences granted by Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the U.S. are 61, 
31, 46, and 67, percent respectively (WTO, WT/COMTD/LDC/W/31), September 29, 2003). Brenton and 
Ikezuki [2004] conclude that the utilization of ACP preferences is quite high (over 80%) for most countries 
but that this measure is upward biased – it does not take into account that for many processed agricultural 
and manufactured products the rules of origin are prohibitive (i.e., the beneficiary LDCs cannot export 
without preferences and the rules of origin are strict enough to prevent the use of preferences).   20
Rules of origin also have more indirect effects. They make it more difficult to 
achieve economies of scale, since input requirements may vary according to destination 
markets of the final products. They also generate an incentive to import components and 
intermediate inputs from the preference-granting country, potentially giving rise to 
economic inefficiency and (additional) trade diversion (Brenton and Manchin, 2002). 
Brenton (2003) provides a survey of these various effects and the recent literature. He 
recognizes that the low utilization of EBA is due to use of ACP preferences and therefore 
places weight on the utilization rates for non-ACP beneficiaries. He concludes non-ACP 
countries are not using EBA  partly due to fact that the rules of origin are less favorable 
than under Cotonou. This finding puts into perspective the additional contribution that the 
EU initiative implied and suggests that the “down payment” implied for the Doha round 
was rather small in total, and did virtually nothing for most of the LDCs.
21 The 
conclusion emerging from recent research (Anson, et al, 2004; Carrère and de Melo 2004 
and Cadot et al. 2004) is that even in the context of reciprocal free trade agreements, 
developing countries get little effective market access since rules of origin are stricter for 
goods where the preference margins are the greatest (see also Hoekman, Ng, and 
Olarreaga, 2002).  
Candau, Fontagne and Jean (2004) find that underutilization matters most in 
textile and garments (for imports into the EU under both GSP and EBA programs). In the 
case of EBA exporters in principle benefit from 100% duty-free access, but are found to 
pay up to 6.5% average tariffs. While Candau et al. conclude that overall much of the 
existing research overstates the extent of underutilization of preferences, they also find 
that the utilization of preferences is lower when the preferential margin is small, 
indicating that compliance costs (such as rules of origin) are a factor.  
Stevens and Kennan (2004) summarize a recent investigation of the effectiveness 
of trade preferences. They conclude that utilization of preferences is high—e.g., only 
2.4% of African exports to the EU that were eligible for ACP preferences (and were not 
duty free under MFN) failed to use the preferences. They also found that EU preferences 
have had limited benefits overall, but that there has been a significant positive impact on 
                                                 
21 Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian (2002) come to the same conclusion in the case of AGOA. The latter 
provides a real world example of the impact of rules of origin as the rules were relaxed for a subset of very 
poor countries for a limited period.  Exports from these countries boomed.   21
a relatively small number of African states that are able to export preferred products. The 
US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was found to have had a major impact 
in boosting clothing exports, especially from countries that benefited from liberal rules of 
origin. Stevens and Kennan conclude that a principal reason for limited benefits of 
preferences is the inability of many countries to produce goods competitively, and not the 
functioning of preference regimes. This suggests the main need is for further action on 
the supply side to facilitate diversification (into preferred goods) by a larger number of 
countries and to assist countries to meet increasingly onerous sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) standards. That is, the solution to greater integration of the poorest countries into 
the trading system extends beyond preferences into the domain of aid and domestic 
policies, a conclusion to which we return below. But they also concur with the 
conclusions of other authors that rules of origin are an important barrier to using 
preferences, and that there is a need for simplification and harmonization of rules of 
origin. 
 
Development Objectives and Political Economy 
A major feature of preferences is that they (are supposed to) result in a resource transfer. 
This transfer is implicit, but measurable. If recipients are able to get higher prices for 
their exports in a protected market, they earn certain rents. These imply a real resource 
transfer from consumers in that preference-granting market to the exporters that benefit 
from preferences. Obvious questions are (i) how large the rents are, (ii) who gets them 
and (iii) whether this is an (politically) efficient way to transfer the associated resources. 
Of course, one can argue that there is more to preferences than rents, as the idea is to 
promote industrialization and that can (should) give rise to positive spillover effects and 
possibly dynamic gains for recipients. The extent to which this occurs is an important 
question for research. The preponderance of the available evidence in this regard is that 
preferences, if effective (i.e., used and of value), have done more to generate rents and 
rent transfers than they have done to foster industrial development (Page and Kleen, 
2004). However, in terms of what would now be called “aid effectiveness”, it is 
important to determine whether preferences—because they are tied to trade, and thus may 
have a variety of spillover benefits in addition to resource transfers—dominate aid. The   22
issue of transfer efficiency is also important, especially in light of possible political 
economy resistance to direct financial transfers to developing countries.
22  
Johnson (1967) was among the first to discuss some of these issues. An early 
formal analysis is McCulloch and Pinera (1977). Assuming a political equilibrium in a 
preference granting country that has determined the external level of protection, they 
assume there is a shift in social preferences that gives higher weight to development 
abroad. There is then a choice to be made between trade (preferences) and aid. The 
former will upset the initial trade policy equilibrium. Preferences have a number of 
effects in their model—they may enhance consumer welfare both because they care about 
development and because the preferences entail partial liberalization and may lower 
import costs. But they come at a cost to the initial social objective that underpinned 
protection in the first place, which helps explain why preferences are in practice often 
“modulated”. While the political economy issues are exogenous in their model, this paper 
formalizes some of the issues also discussed by Johnson [1967] on the tradeoffs and 
linkages between preferential trade and aid.
23 
  Ray [1987] provides an empirical assessment of the hypothesis that political 
economy forces play an important role in shaping the extent of effective market access 
granted under GSP schemes. He shows that special interests were able in the US to limit 
the ability of “preferred” suppliers to contest the most protected market segments—which 
are protected by other instruments in addition to tariffs, including NTBs. The Caribbean 
Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) is a good example of the prevalence and impact 
of such political constraints. When enacted, only about one-fourth of the exports of 
CBERA countries were subject to duty; 
24  Ten years later, just 19 percent of the region’s 
exports to the United States entered duty-free under the CBERA, and only 10.1 percent 
would not otherwise have been eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP or the US 
off-shore assembly program (see above). If  account is taken of product coverage 
restrictions, CBERA benefits implied a net reduction in applicable tariffs of some 40 
                                                 
22 For example, Borrell (2004) argues that for every dollar of benefit that the EU banana policy brought to 
producers in ACP countries, the regime harmed non-ACP developing country producers by almost exactly 
one dollar—and in the process harmed EU consumers by more than US$13. Aksoy and Beghin (2003) 
report that every dollar equivalent transferred to recipients under US preferences costs US$5. 
23 See Adam and O’Connell (2004) for a more recent analysis of this question. 
24 What follows draws on OECD (1997).    23
percent, and not free access for protected goods. As of the mid 1990s, the average tariff 
paid by Caribbean basin exports to the United States was higher than it was before 
CBERA was enacted (OECD, 1997). Limited export expansion also reflected quotas and 
other NTBs, especially for products such as sugar and textiles and clothing. Not 
surprisingly, benefits are concentrated in highly protected agricultural products (tobacco, 
sugar, and beef) and in products assembled from US components for export to the US 
(electronic equipment).
25   
In much of the research on preferences it is generally implicitly assumed that the 
difference between domestic prices prevailing in the protected market granting 
preferential access and the world price (the amount of tariff revenue avoided by preferred 
exporters) accrues to (is captured by) the exporting firms (country). It is not clear that this 
will necessarily be the case. After all, importers will know that the price wedge exists, 
and, if they have some market power, it is likely that they will reduce the prices offered 
to suppliers in the preference receiving  countries and capture some of the difference 
themselves. Thus, in practice some of the rents created by preferences—if any—will be 
captured by importers and/or distributors. Olarreaga and Ozden (2004) investigate this 
issue in the case of garment exports from AGOA beneficiaries to the US and conclude 
that two-thirds of the rents created by AGOA may actually go to U.S. importers. Stevens 
and Kennan (2004) also conclude that the important role of US buyers and their ability to 
choose the country from which to import suggests that they will be able to appropriate 
some of the rents. They note that part of the rents stay with the beneficiaries, and that this 
adds to the gains, i.e., come on top of the additional volume of exports (and 
production/employment) generated by the preferences. In practice, much will depend on 
how a preference scheme works, in particular whether there are quotas allocated and the 
characteristics of the products (market structure, substitutability, etc.). Page and Kleen 
(2004) argue that the EU sugar quotas, by assigning specific quotas to countries, probably 
ensure that much of the rent will go to the recipient countries.
26 
                                                 
25 Rousslang and Lindsey (1984), Pelzman and Schoepfle (1988) and Sawyer and Sprinkle (1990) provide 
empirical estimated of the likely impact of CBERA. 
26 Özden and Sharma (2004) found that the price increase associated with preferential access to the US for 
Caribbean exports was much less than the difference between world and US domestic prices. They 
conclude that CBI exporters get two-thirds of preference margin, and that this has been eroded by NAFTA 
and will erode further post ATC implementation.   24
 
Political Economy Effects in Recipient Countries 
The likelihood of an importing country removing trade preferences is  highly correlated 
with the growth rate of the exports of the beneficiary country (Ozden and Reinhardt 
(2003). In other words, countries are likely to be excluded when they start to export ‘too 
much’—i.e., once they actually start to benefit from GSP programs. Ozden and Reinhardt 
(2003) compare the export performances of US GSP beneficiaries with those of countries 
that were removed from eligibility (‘graduated’). Their results suggest that countries that 
were removed from the GSP outperform those remaining eligible for GSP treatment. 
Graduates tend to have higher export/GDP and industrial exports/GDP ratios, as well as 
higher growth rates. They hypothesize that this finding may be due to graduating 
countries undertaking own reforms and making more market access concessions 
themselves.
27 
  In a follow up paper, Ozden and Reinhardt (2005), they explore whether there is 
any evidence that there is a causal relationship between preferences and a more 
protectionist trade policy stance in recipient countries. They find that US GSP recipients 
implement more protectionist trade policies compared to countries removed from the 
GSP program. They note that preferences can decrease the incentives for domestic 
exporters to mobilize in favor of more liberal trade policies. Since own trade policies are 
more important for developing countries’ growth prospects than barriers in export 
markets, this perverse incentive effect of unilateral preferences may be quite damaging. 
This line of argument has not gone unchallenged. It can be argued that if  a 
(transitional) SDT regime is required to help developing countries to successfully 
liberalize their economies, Ozden and Reinhardt may be finding evidence that preference 
programs are working as intended (or designed). Clearly for some countries—the 
successful ones that were “graduated”—GSP may have played a role in generating the 
initial export expansion and then breaking a domestic political deadlock that precluded 
opening up the economy. Major exporters such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27 The potential detrimental incentive effects of preferences on recipient’s own trade policies were noted by 
Hudec (1987).   25
Singapore all benefited from US and EU preferences in the 1970s, and subsequently to 
being removed from eligibility continued to do very well on the export front.  
Conconi and Perroni (2004) develop a theoretical framework that provides an 
economic rationale for what is observed by Ozden and Reinhardt. They argue that 
preferences are premised on inter-temporal reciprocity, and that the fact that recipients 
lower their trade barriers once they have graduated from GSP may simply reflect a 
temporal lag between reciprocal concessions, rather than GSP graduation directly 
inducing countries to liberalize. The stylized facts that motivate the Conconi and Perroni 
analysis are the following: LDCs get deeper preferences than other developing countries; 
as (very) small price takers LDCs should in principle pursue unilateral liberalization, but 
do not; and preferences are granted on an explicitly temporary basis. These stylized facts 
are argued to indicate that the (political) constraints on trade liberalization faced by LDC 
governments are viewed by all parties as transitory, and that the apparent gap between 
short-run protection incentives (because of lobbying) and long-run liberalization 
incentives reflects a time consistency problem for LDC governments. This commitment 
problem can then explain both the scope for SDT-based trade cooperation with the large 
developed country, and the temporary nature of SDT. Given the commitment problem 
(and also assuming there are adjustment costs), a self-enforcing dynamic agreement is 
argued to necessarily feature higher protection in the small country in comparison with 
long-run equilibrium tariff (i.e. delayed implementation); and, lower protection by the 
large country (i.e. temporary GSP concessions). Thus, their model rationalizes temporary 
SDT as a transitional cooperative regime between a (small) developing country and a 
large, high income economy. The concessions are reciprocal but non-simultaneous, and 
are linked, explicitly or implicitly, by conditionality, given that cooperative trade policy 




                                                 
28 As noted above, explicit conditionality is often part and parcel of GSP programs. For example, the US in 
AGOA conditions preferences on actions by recipients to eliminate “barriers to US trade and investment”.  
An October 20, 2004 EU proposal for a new, simplified GSP regime would make preferences conditional 
of recipients signing 27 international treaties, including 16 ILO conventions, three dealing with drugs and 7 
pertaining to the environment.   26
Summing up: Preferences—the good, the bad and the ugly 
The bottom line is that the research suggests that preferences are widely used by many 
countries, but that the benefits are reduced by a variety of factors, whether by design, 
incidentally, or by domestic supply constraints. Much depends on how binding rules of 
origin are and how high are MFN tariffs. A recent analysis suggests that if one assumes 
away preferences – i.e., only MFN barriers are assumed to apply – developing countries 
would confront higher protection in the OECD than other countries, i.e., the current 
structure of protection implies a negative preference margin. This is illustrated by the 
darker bars in Figure 1, which reports an overall trade restrictiveness index (OTRI).
29 
Alternatively, if it is assumed preferences are fully utilized – that is, we assume away 
rules of origin and other constraints, which are known in practice to reduce the utilization 
of preferences, and it is assumed that all rents created by preferences accrue to exporters 
– there is still much to be done to remove the negative effect of trade barriers.   
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The average reduction in OECD trade barriers due to the preference programs is 
not more than 20-30 percent of MFN rates (IMF and World Bank, 2004). In part this is 
due to (i) the effect of NTBs that apply to all imports, (ii) the fact that OECD countries 
                                                 
29 What follows draws on Hoekman (2004a). The OTRI is the uniform tariff equivalent of all the trade 
policies (tariffs and core NTBs) maintained by a country that would replicate the observed volume of 
imports. It includes estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs, core NTBs, and agricultural 
producer subsidies. See Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) for details.   27
often trade on a duty-free basis as a result of PTAs and (iii) the incomplete coverage of 
non-reciprocal preference programs (product exceptions, etc.).  If, more realistically, it is 
assumed that utilization rates are only 50 percent, the OTRI against LDCs is roughly the 
same as that applying to all trade: around 6 percent. 
A key question in assessing the effect of preferences is whether they help create 
industries that are viable—i.e., can survive the removal of preferences, either as the result 
of unilateral actions or MFN liberalization (such as tariff reductions or the abolition of 
the final ATC quotas at the end of 2004). If they do, the preferences have helped nurture 
infant export industries and achieved their goal. If they do not, they provide only a 
temporary increase in income, ‘rents’ from the higher price attainable in the protected 
market. This resource transfer can be significant, as is the case for sugar and bananas, , 
for some countries (Mauritius, the Caribbean). For such commodities and beneficiary 
countries the only benefit is the increase in income. Even if they do, one must ask at what 
cost to donors, to recipients and the rest of the world. Clearly in some cases preferences 
have helped to generate transfer of skills and know how—e.g., in the case of AGOA for 
apparel exports from Lesotho. Page and Kleen (2004) argue that some of the exporters 
‘created’ by the MFA or more recently by AGOA, such as Bangladesh, Mauritius, and 
perhaps Lesotho, will have higher exports than they would have done without their period 
of high preferences due to the ATC, even when this “preference” is eliminated. 
Are preferences good for development? It is probably fair to say that the jury is 
still out, in that there is no consensus in the literature. However, the majority view seems 
to be that they are at best a marginal benefit. There is a consensus that they are certainly 
not sufficient. Their value as a development tool has been limited for all the reasons that 
have been identified in the literature. If effective in increasing recipients national income, 
this comes at a cost to other developing countries through trade diversion and the inherent 
discrimination associated with preferences. Also, if effective in transferring resources, 
one can question the cost effectiveness both in terms of costs to consumers/taxpayers in 
donor countries and the costs associated with the various side conditions, uncertainty, etc. 
Much also depends on how the associated rents and additional income are distributed 
within the recipient countries and how it is used. If not used to improve the investment 
climate and foster diversification, preferences may  have perverse effect of inducing   28
countries to remain specialized in low value commodity production and other sectors in 
which they do not have comparative advantage. Finally, it should be kept in mind that 
preferences imply discrimination and thus trade diversion and red tape. The most 
successful examples of countries that used trade as a core part of their growth strategy in 
the last 30-40 years—the period of preferences—did not rely on them for their export 
success.  
From Uruguay to Doha and Beyond 
The second major plank of SDT in the trading system concerns the reach of WTO rules 
and technical assistance. A precondition for developing countries to benefit from WTO 
membership is “getting the rules right” from a development perspective. Most developing 
countries are late-comers to the multilateral trading system – a fact that helps explain why 
many present WTO rules predominantly reflect the interests of rich countries and the 
status quo disciplines that already have been put in place by them. Thus, the much greater 
latitude that exists in the WTO for the use of agricultural subsidization, for example, 
reflects the use of such support policies in many developed countries.  The same is true 
for the permissive approach that has historically been taken toward the use of import 
quotas on textile products – in principle prohibited by GATT rules. More recently, the 
inclusion of rules on the protection of intellectual property rights has strengthened 
perceptions that the WTO contract is unbalanced.   
Rather than use a case-by-case approach based on economic analysis to determine 
the development costs and benefits of specific proposals or rules, the WTO has relied 
primarily on a mix of temporary and permanent exceptions for developing countries, with 
temporary exemptions taking the form of (uniform) transition periods for two broad 
categories of countries (LDCs and all other developing countries). Thus countries do not 
have any multilateral “assurance” that rules will only apply once the preconditions are in 
place to benefit from implementation. This is a function of the extent to which other 
members perceive it to be in their interest to initiate dispute settlement proceedings 
and/or their willingness to accord waivers and provide assistance with implementation of 
resource-intensive disciplines. 
It is a basic principle of economics that interventions should directly target the 
source of a market failure. Trade policy will rarely do so. Even if trade policies are used,   29
there is a clear efficiency ranking of instruments, quotas and analogous instruments being 
particularly costly. WTO rules that impose disciplines on the use of such instruments 
benefit both consumers and producers and enhance social welfare. Similarly, binding 
tariffs and abiding by WTO rules and criteria for taking actions against imports that 
injure domestic industry are beneficial – by reducing investor uncertainty and requiring a 
determination of the facts underlying a situation. This is not to deny there are second best 
cases where intervention may be justified, but such cases need to be documented. This is 
rarely done. 
The papers by Hindley (1987) and Wolf (1984), written as countries were gearing 
up to launch the Uruguay Round, argued that many of the policies that are permitted by 
the GATT/WTO will be ineffective or inefficient. Both also argue—to use Wolf’s term—
that SDT is a two-edged sword: it may produce some benefits, but there are costs as well, 
including the systemic effects of efforts to maintain preference margins. Wolf is critical 
of the Enabling Clause—including looser disciplines on South-South preferential trade 
agreements, which he argues can do little to promote development or increase the 
bargaining power of  developing economies. The numerous exceptions and exclusions for 
developing countries in the GATT will not help governments deal with the political 
economy factors that keep high-cost  protectionist policies in place. More specifically, 
Hindley notes that a greater focus on differentiation between SDT recipients is needed, 
implying in turn the need for a more explicit focus on “graduation” in the WTO.
30 
The issues raised in these papers continue to dominate WTO discussions. There is 
a huge literature on the fundamental question whether the core trade policy rules of the 
WTO should apply to all countries, developed and developing. Some of this literature is 
summarized in the Hindley and Wolf papers.
31 Much of this research went (and goes) 
against the type of rule-related SDT found in the GATT. It resonated with many GATT 
members in the Uruguay Round. As discussed in Whalley (1999), a major result was that 
rather than allow opt-outs, the focus turned to integration of developing countries into the 
                                                 
30 As argued by Michalopoulos (2000), limited country coverage is a political precondition for meaningful 
preferential treatment for the poorest countries. See also Pangestu (2000).  Hart and Dymond (2002) is a 
recent paper in the vein of Wolf (1984). 
31 For recent assessments of the East Asian experience and the case for trade intervention see Noland and 
Pack (2003), Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001) and Panagariya (2003a). McCulloch, Winters and Cirera 
(2001) survey some of the literature.   30
system of rules. The presumption (implicit if not always explicit) was that “one size fits 
all” and that the rules of the game were beneficial to all, and needed to be implemented 
by all (Finger, 2002). Until the Uruguay Round, many new GATT agreements were 
implemented on a voluntary basis—only signatory countries were bound by them 
(Hoekman and Kostecki [2001]). The Single Undertaking removed this practice and 
required virtually all WTO agreements to apply to all member countries, irrespective of 
level of development. It was of course recognized that some countries confronted 
implementation constraints and associated burdens. This was addressed through the use 
of longer transition periods for developing countries, supplemented by promises of 
technical assistance, not through opt-outs. The shift was not (just) a reflection of North-
South differences—many developing countries also viewed the old type of SDT “as 
ideological baggage from the past, or described as a crutch which developing countries 
no longer needed and which was actually hindering their competitiveness” (Gibbs, 1998). 
The consequence was that in contrast to the GATT, SDT under the WTO became issue- 
or agreement-specific—there was (and is) no overarching conceptual framework to 
recognize development needs and constraints. 
A reason for the change that occurred in the “type” of SDT found in the WTO as 
compared to GATT was that, during the 1980s, SDT increasingly became perceived as an 
ineffective instrument. It had not delivered what it was supposed to: greater participation 
of developing countries (recipients) in the multilateral trading system (Wolf, 1984; 
Whalley, 1999). Starting in the 1980s, developing countries also began to perceive that 
the balance of their interests had changed—they were increasingly subject to non-tariff 
barriers and measures that increased the extent of discrimination against them, offsetting 
any benefits from preferences. Among these were higher use of voluntary export 
restraints (VERs), unilateral threats in particular by the US to invoke Section 301 against 
their alleged “unfair trade practices” (especially in the area of intellectual property 
protection), an ever expanding web of free trade agreements between developed 
countries, steady expansion of the product and country coverage of the MFA, and 
mounting use of contingent protection (especially anti-dumping). Moreover, the so-called 
Tokyo Round codes (agreements on new issues and extensions of existing GATT 
disciplines), while not binding developing countries that did not wish to subscribe to   31
them, was moving the trading system towards a more clearly defined two-track regime, 
with the possibility of non-signatories being excluded from the benefits arising under the 
codes. One consequence was that developing countries saw an interest in strengthening 
multilateral disciplines. As a result, specific emphasis was put on banning the use of 
VERs, the abolition of the MFA, the re-insertion of agricultural trade into the GATT, and 
strengthening the dispute settlement mechanism (the latter very much driven by a desire 
to discipline the use of Section 301 actions by the US).
32  
Some of the resulting WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on Trade-
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), were highly skewed towards 
benefiting rich countries. Others generated asymmetric implementation costs because the 
new rules that were written reflected existing practices in developed countries (Finger, 
2002; Weston, 1995). As a result, it is not too much of an exaggeration to speak of an 
Uruguay Round “hangover” for many developing countries –and a great deal of 
skepticism regarding the benefits of WTO membership (Hoekman, 2002). Starting in the 
late 1990s a re-thinking of the Uruguay Round approach began, in parallel with the Doha 
round talks. 
The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration emphasized the importance of SDT, 
stating that “provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the 
WTO agreements.” Paragraph 44 called for a review of SDT provisions with to the aim 
of “strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational.” On the 
basis of this mandate, developing countries made 88 suggestions to strengthen SDT 
language in various WTO agreements.  The proposals included calls for improved 
preferential access to industrialized countries, further exemptions from specific WTO 
rules, and binding commitments on developed countries to provide technical assistance to 
help implement multilateral rules. Despite intensive talks during 2002-03, no agreement 
on these proposals emerged.  One reason was that many of the proposals sought to 
convert nonbinding, “best endeavors” language into obligations binding on developed 
countries.  Another was disagreement over what types of provisions would promote 
development. With the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial meetings none of these 
demands were implemented. 
                                                 
32 See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) for more discussion and references to the literature.   32
 
Moving Forward: Key Challenges 
There are many issues on the table, but two stand out: whether to maintain preferences as 
a form of aid, and what to do about preference erosion; and whether and how to enhance 
the “development relevance” of WTO rules.  
 
Preference erosion and MFN-based reforms 
As mentioned, preference erosion is an old concern that was already being analyzed in 
the 1970s. Until recently the question of erosion was not a particularly strong constraint 
on MFN-based reforms in the GATT/WTO because GSP programs only gave a 
preference and not duty/quota free access. Thus, even if MFN rates were lowered, it was 
possible to maintain a given preference margin (by lowering the preferential tariff and or 
expanding the coverage of the scheme). New programs such as EBA or AGOA feature 
duty and quota-free access for (virtually) all products and therefore any reductions in 
MFN tariffs lower the preference margin. A basic question confronting WTO members 
now is whether to continue to use trade preferences as a form of aid—which could have 
the effect of precluding a move to very low or zero MFN tariffs.  
An early analysis and potential response to the preference erosion “constraint” 
was suggested by Ahmad (1977), who proposed limiting the impacts on the preference 
erosion side through a selective application of MFN liberalization—on goods that 
developing countries do not produce (yet). Ahmad argues that “there is little doubt that in 
the long run the problem of the industrializing Third World is one of securing unlimited 
access to world markets through across-the-board tariff reductions. In the meantime, 
however, the continuation of preferential margins … has a higher probability of inducing 
initial investment and productivity in developing countries’ manufacturing sectors.” This 
is an argument that has continued to be made by those supporting (more effective) 
preferences, including the suggestion that preference margins be bound in the GATT.
33 
Yamazaki (1996) estimates the value of EU, Japanese and US  schemes to 
beneficiary countries with a view to determining the potential impact of preference 
                                                 
33 As already noted, doing this is very difficult to operationalize if MFN tariffs continue to fall—if 
considered seriously, it would imply stopping MFN liberalization.   33
erosion across countries (regions). He concludes that the preferences, on average, equal 
12 percent of the total value of eligible exports, three-quarters of which is generated by 
EU programs. Echoing others in the literature, almost half of the total benefits (by export 
value) generated by the EU is due to the EU Sugar Protocol.
34 Yamazaki’s conclusions 
that the impact of preferences are highly concentrated—a recurrent finding in the 
literature has been well known for decades—also suggests that problems of preference 
erosion are concentrated.  
There are two crucial questions: the potential magnitude of erosion (a key input 
into any determination of the overall level of financing that may be needed to address it) 
and the sectoral composition of the potential impacts (a key factor determining the 
incidence and distribution of adjustment costs within countries). Using a partial 
equilibrium framework, IMF (2003) examines the overall impact on the exports of LDCs 
from preference erosion arising from trade liberalization by the Quad. Assuming a 40 
percent cut in protection in the Quad and that LDCs have free access to these markets (a 
strong assumption given the literature cited above), it concludes that the potential loss at 
the aggregate level amounts to just 1.7 percent of total LDC exports. However, individual 
LDCs may suffer a more significant loss from preference erosion due the concentration 
of their exports in products that enjoy deep preferences. Of these, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Haiti, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe are found to be the most vulnerable to 
preference erosion. Malawi was predicted to experience a loss of 11.5% of total exports, 
the next four countries between 5 and 10%, and another 10 countries between  3% to 5%.  
The total (aggregate) value of export revenue that would be lost was around $530 million 
(of which two-fifths would be accounted for by Bangladesh). Note that these are small 
numbers—equivalent to only one percent of ODA flows.  
Earlier research by Yeats (1995), also using a partial equilibrium framework, 
estimates that the complete elimination of MFN tariffs by the EU, Japan and the United 
States would result in total erosion costs for 29 Sub-Saharan African countries of some 
US$4.2 billion of exports (in present discounted value terms), with the reductions in 
exports to the EU and Japan on the order of 1-2 percent, and an increase in exports to the 
                                                 
34 Also significant were preferences for tobacco. As noted by Alexandraki and Lankes (2004), given that 
Yamazaki’s dataset ends in 1992, bananas are not covered as the EU banana regime began in 1993.   34
US market (of some 4 percent). The latter is driven by the fact that nondiscriminatory 
liberalization by the US more than offsets any erosion losses. Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe account for 85 percent of the total predicted loss. Yeats 
predicts that sub-Saharan Africa will lose more exports through the erosion of 
preferential treatment than it will gain from MFN trade liberalization.  Page and 
Davenport (1994) come to similar conclusions, with predicted reductions in ACP and 
LDC exports on the order of 1-2 percent, with Ethiopia (5.9 percent), Malawi (5.3 
percent), Guyana (4.8 percent), Mozambique (4.6 percent), and Jamaica (3.2 percent) 
experiencing larger impacts (OECD, 1997). 
    The limited number and small size of most of the economies concerned imply 
that measures to help mitigate the impact of preference erosion should be closely targeted 
at the countries at risk. The detailed assessment by Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) 
indicates that many of the countries concerned are not among the poorest, but are middle-
income economies. They include sugar, textiles and banana programs in their analysis. 
Indeed, the IMF analysis and Steven and Kennan (2004) suggest that the potential erosion 
problem is heavily concentrated in (small island) economies that are dependent on quota-
type preferences and the associated rents in these sectors.
35 The problem is therefore also 
commodity-specific since they are concentrated in areas where OECD protection and 
preference margins are the highest. As stressed by Tangermann (2002), insofar as 
preferences have had the result of “sucking” investment and production into the wrong 
direction (i.e., areas where they do not have a comparative advantage), the effect has been 
to make the beneficiaries dependent on preferential exports. As the sugar and banana 
regimes are reformed in the EU, such countries will be confronted with major adjustment 
costs. 
The solution to this problem is not to maintain (or expand) the existing 
preferences but to ensure that the countries concerned are assisted. An appropriate 
response would be for the OECD countries to convert the (implicit) “preference 
                                                 
35 Preference dependent or sensitive countries include Mauritius, Malawi, Mauritania, Cambodia, Maldives, 
Haiti, Cape Verde, Sao Tome, Tanzania and the Comoros (Stevens and Kennan, 2004). The only large 
country expected to suffer from preference erosion is Bangladesh, which has benefited significantly from 
the quota restrictions imposed on other large competitive developing countries such as China. It can be 
noted that the potential impact on non-quota controlled textile and clothing exporters of removal of quotas 
has been on the agenda since the negotiation to end the MFA in the Uruguay Round (Page and Davenport 
1994).   35
transfers” into equivalent development assistance, which could be used by the recipient 
governments to fund adjustment costs.  In the case of farmers in beneficiary countries 
(e.g., sugar, bananas) an option could be to integrate them into OECD farm policies and 
extend decoupled income-support to them as well as to national farmers. How to 
implement the needed shift from preferences to aid is likely to become an important part 
of the Doha agenda. A number of issues would have to be resolved:  (i) ensuring that 
financing commitments are (and are seen to be) credible; (ii) the associated aid is 
additional to existing flows; and (iii) ensuring that the aid was used to effectively address 
the adjustment burden in recipient economies. It is important that the financing facility be 
a temporary one that is limited to dealing with the adjustment costs associated with 
preference erosion. Insofar as developed countries desire to support the countries 
concerned on a longer term basis, the appropriate vehicle is aid.
36 
Finally, we should note that in principle, if countries desire to continue using 
trade as a form of aid, this could be achieved even if all MFN duties are abolished. Limao 
and Olarreaga (2004) argue that in such a scenario importing countries could simply give 
beneficiary countries an import subsidy. Their analysis suggests that the conversion of all 
current tariff preferences into equivalent import subsidies would enhance welfare in both 
donor and recipient countries. 
 
WTO Rules and Development 
The last set of papers included in this volume address how the WTO might better reflect 
the development needs of its members. A common theme of these papers is that currently 
there is not enough differentiation (flexibility) when it comes to WTO disciplines and 
that more needs to be done to deal with potential losses from preference erosion. Several 
options have been proposed in the literature to address the problem of differential 
priorities and capacities across WTO members:
37  
•  Acceptance of the principle of “policy space” – implying flexibility for all 
developing countries as currently (self-) defined in the WTO system whether to 
                                                 
36 For recent discussions of and proposals for an adjustment facility tied to the implementation of a Doha 
round set of reforms, see Hoekman (2004b), Page and Kleen (2004), and Winters (2004).  
37 See also Oyejide (2002), Fukasaku (2000), Commonwealth Secretariat (2000), Corrales-Leal et al. 
(2002), Keck and Low (2004) and Melamed (2002).   36
implement a specific set of (new) rules, as long as this does not impose significant 
negative (pecuniary) spillovers (Stevens, 2002, 2003).   
•  A country-specific approach that would make implementation of new rules a 
function of national priorities. WTO disciplines implying significant resources 
would be implemented only when this conforms with or supports the attainment 
of national development strategies.  A process of multilateral monitoring and 
surveillance, with input by international development agencies, would be 
established to ensure that decisions are subject to scrutiny and debate (Prowse, 
2002);  
•  An agreement-specific approach involving the ex ante setting of specific criteria 
on an agreement-by-agreement basis to determine whether a country could opt out 
of applying negotiated disciplines for a limited time period.  Criteria could 
include indicators of administrative capacity, country size and level of 
development and a link might be made between implementation and the provision 
of financial and technical assistance (Wang and Winters, 2000; Stevens, 2002;  
Keck and Low, 2004).  
•  A simple rule-of-thumb approach that would allow opt-outs for an agreed set of 
disciplines for all countries satisfying broad threshold criteria such as minimum 
level of per capita income, institutional capacity or economic scale (Hoekman, 
Michalopoulos and Winters, 2003).  The presumption here is that this would 
allow the bulk of identified difficulties to be tackled at little or no negotiating 
cost.  Invocation of an opt-out would be voluntary.  As countries come to surpass 
thresholds over time, disciplines automatically would become applicable. 
 
A common element of many proposals is that use is made of economic criteria to 
determine the applicability of resource-intensive rules.  This makes good sense from an 
economic perspective, but is very controversial in the WTO as greater differentiation 
among countries is rejected by many developing-country representatives.  Currently, 
whether a rule is enforced is left to individual members (i.e., whether or not to self-
declare as a developing country) and a mix of unilateral action and bargaining by 
developed-country members whether to accept this and whether to provide SDT.  In 
practice, small and poor countries are unlikely to be confronted with dispute 
settlement/enforcement situations, for their markets are too small to induce action.
38   
Country classification inevitably creates tensions among governments as to which 
countries would be eligible.  The advantage of simple criteria along the Hoekman, 
Michalopoulos and Winters (2004) lines is that it is “clean” – there is no need for 
additional negotiation.  The disadvantage is that criteria will inherently be somewhat 
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WTO commitment may have relatively large effects.    37
arbitrary.  The scope for agreeing on a rule-specific or agreement-specific set of criteria 
has in the past proven feasible – witness the per-capita income threshold in the WTO 
Subsidies Agreement for the use of export subsidies, the net food importers group defined 
in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture or the (implicit) group of countries that do not 
have a pharmaceutical industry that were the focal point of the Doha Round 
TRIPS/public health debate. Stevens (2003) discusses possible approaches towards 
agreement-specific criteria to define SDT. The downside here is that poor countries will 
be confronted with inevitable negotiation costs and the need to allocate scarce human 
resources to issues that may not be priorities.  
A criteria-based approach will not do much to engage governments and 
stakeholders, or to help them identify better policies or areas where complementary 
actions/investments are needed. The presumption underlying criteria-based approaches is 
that SDT is needed as a mechanism to prevent countries from being confronted by 
disputes for noncompliance and to identify those needing technical assistance. An 
alternative approach could be to do more to take government objectives and constraints 
seriously (Prowse, 2002). This might involve a more economically based interaction 
between WTO members in instances where countries are not in conformity with WTO 
rules to determine whether policies were having their intended effect and whether more 
efficient (less trade distorting) instruments might be feasible.
39 Greater “policy dialogue” 
and multilateral monitoring of the effects of policies applied by WTO members could 
both help to increase the (domestic) accountability of governments and the “ownership” 
of policies and the multilateral rules.  
It could also do much to increase the effectiveness of technical assistance. This is 
probably a critical input into the delivery of such assistance, a topic that attracted much 
attention post Seattle, and the subject of the paper by Prowse (2002). Greater 
transparency is critical to prevent capture of policies by interest groups, to make policies 
contestable and to give both winners and losers a greater voice in policy formation. While 
                                                 
39 As discussed at greater length in Hoekman (2004b), there is an obvious trade-off between reducing the 
reach of the DSU and strengthening the development relevance of WTO rules and mechanisms by allowing 
greater policy flexibility for developing countries. The latter have a great deal to lose if the DSU is 
hollowed out, as one consequence could be that developed countries become less inclined or are given 
scope to argue that they should not be held accountable for implementation of negotiated disciplines. Thus, 
such consultative mechanisms should not preclude recourse to dispute settlement by any member. 
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an approach that is more intensive in “policy dialogue” may seem rather far-reaching 
given the legal nature of the WTO rules, there are already numerous mechanisms in the 
WTO that can be – and at times are – used to engage in policy dialogue.  These include 
the committees that oversee the operation of specific agreements and the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism. One committee that explicitly includes a multilateral process of 
assessment of the prevailing economic situation in countries as a justification for the use 
of trade restrictions is the Balance of Payments Committee. This operates with inputs 
from the IMF on the balance-of-payments situation in a member that invokes the relevant 
GATT articles as cover for trade barriers.  In practice deliberations have mostly been 
“cooperative”, with only very cases of recourse being made to the DSU (Prowse, 2002).  
Conclusion: Looking Ahead  
The integration of developing countries into the global economy, especially through 
increased international trade, is a commonly cited and shared objective. One of the 
dominant paradigms of the last 40 years, special and differential treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries in the GATT/WTO, does not seem to have delivered what was 
intended from it. There is a large literature on the reasons for this failure, some of which 
has been discussed above. The early debates and arguments that pointed to the potential 
downsides of SDT proved quite prescient—benefits have been limited, skewed in their 
distribution, and arguably obtained at high cost to the trading system, donor country 
consumers and many of the purported beneficiaries. Research has demonstrated that 
preferences can at best play a marginal role to assist developing countries—what 
determines and drives performance is not what others do, but what countries do for 
themselves. The latter is also a primary determinant of the effect of preferences, 
conditional on the extent to which donor countries do not limit the magnitude of the 
potential benefit through exceptions, limitations, rules of origin, etc. Whether and to what 
extent preferences and traditional SDT actually hurt countries with weak administrative 
capacity and institutions (governance) remains a matter for debate.  
Whatever the view one takes away from the experience with SDT and preference 
programs, a good case exists for revisiting the decision to use trade (preferences) as aid 
(Panagariya, 2003b). Duty-free access for the products of all developing countries   39
dominates discriminatory treatment of only a subset (Hoekman, Michalopoulos and 
Winters, 2004). Moving in this direction implies the erosion of all preferences, both GSP 
and the deeper, more recent preferences. Even if this does not happen—and realism 
suggests it will not—further MFN-based Doha Round reforms could have a substantial 
impact on some countries, especially those with high concentrations of exports in highly 
protected commodities. The answer is not to avoid liberalization of the sectors where 
preferences matter most, in the process maintaining a complex system of managed trade 
in the key sectors where significant rents exist. What is needed is to move toward 
adoption of transparent, nondiscriminatory trade policies, as initially envisaged by the  
founders of the GATT. This will imply costs for some countries, which in turn requires 
credible commitments on the part of industrialized countries to assist during the transition 
to address adjustment costs, and to shift toward the use of development assistance to 
realize longer-term resource transfers to poor countries. An expansion in development 
assistance would constitute both a more efficient and more effective instrument than 
preferences– as long as these resources are allocated to priority projects through a 
national development or poverty reduction strategy and used effectively. Given the 
history of preference programs, developed countries as a group should arguably shoulder 
this burden: they instituted and preserved the system of discretionary preferences, and 
they also have the largest interests in the trading system (Page and Kleen, 2004; 
Hoekman, 2004b).     40
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